China’s new venture in the Bay of Bengal: An opportunity or a Trap?

Hardly had the diplomatic tension between Bangladesh and India over the Teesta River project subsided when the proposed China-Myanmar-Bangladesh Economic Corridor (CMBEC) took center stage in contemporary discussions. For Dhaka, this could on one hand open new doors of economic potential, while on the other hand, it risks turning Bangladesh into a focal point of regional diplomacy, security concerns, and superpower rivalry.

During Bangladesh Prime Minister Tarique Rahman’s recent visit to Beijing, Chinese President Xi Jinping proposed this corridor. Alongside this, discussions between the two nations also covered the development of Chittagong and Mongla ports, Chinese economic zones, Teesta management, and infrastructural cooperation. However, the Bangladesh government has stated that the proposal is still under review, and a decision will be made solely by prioritizing national interests.

According to the proposal, there is a plan to develop an economic and communication corridor extending from Kunming in China’s Yunnan province, passing through Mandalay and Rakhine in Myanmar, to Cox’s Bazar and Chittagong, with future extensions up to Mongla. Simultaneously, China’s interest in establishing a new economic zone near Mongla Port, alongside an existing roughly 800-acre project in Chittagong, has come to light.

From Bangladesh’s perspective, the greatest potential of this corridor lies in enhancing regional connectivity. Establishing direct overland communication with China through Myanmar could significantly reduce both the time and cost of cargo transportation. This would boost export competitiveness, attract foreign investment, accelerate industrialization, and create opportunities to transform Chittagong and Mongla ports into regional transit hubs. The government also underscores that minimizing transport costs and increasing regional connectivity remain their primary considerations.

China has already expanded duty-free access for Bangladeshi products and promised further investments, industrial parks, and infrastructural development. Dhaka expects that the implementation of this corridor would yield positive outcomes across production, employment, and exports.

However, alongside the economic prospects come major strategic questions. For India, this corridor is not merely an infrastructure project. It is directly linked to the security of the Bay of Bengal and Northeast India. Security analysts in Delhi fear that if the corridor is realized, China could establish a deeper strategic footprint in the Bay of Bengal. This could affect India’s security calculations surrounding the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, its eastern coast, and the northeastern region.

The Indian Ministry of External Affairs has said that it is closely monitoring this proposal and the recent engagements between Bangladesh and China. Although no harsh objections have been voiced publicly, the matter is being treated with serious weight from a strategic viewpoint. Meanwhile, Bangladesh Foreign Minister Khalilur Rahman has stated that the government is still reviewing the China-Myanmar-Bangladesh corridor proposal and has not yet reached any final decision.

Another point of concern for India remains the Teesta project. If China becomes a major partner in both Teesta management and the new corridor alongside the long-unresolved Teesta issue, Delhi's strategic discomfort could intensify. Although India has refrained from expressing harsh reactions publicly, indications of concern are evident through various analyses and official sources.
International relations analysts believe that China’s objective is not limited to trade alone. Beijing has long been attempting to reduce its dependence on the Malacca Strait. Currently, a massive volume of Chinese energy and commercial goods transits through this narrow waterway. If this route were to be disrupted during a war or conflict, the Chinese economy could face severe risks. Therefore, establishing an alternative route directly to the Bay of Bengal through Myanmar is viewed as part of Beijing’s long-term strategy.

However, the most significant practical obstacle to this corridor is Myanmar. A major portion of the proposed route passes through Rakhine State, where ongoing civil war and conflicts involving the Arakan Army persist. Consequently, without ensuring security, implementing the project could prove difficult. At the same time, the issue of Rohingya repatriation has become intertwined with this corridor. Dhaka hopes that progress can be achieved in Rohingya repatriation through Chinese mediation, though the actual situation remains uncertain.

Meanwhile, another crucial factor is that Bangladesh now stands in a geopolitical position where four parties—China, India, the United States, and Pakistan—are actively working to protect their respective strategic interests. On one hand, there is Chinese infrastructure and investment, and on the other, India’s security concerns, the US Indo-Pacific Strategy, and new diplomatic engagements with Pakistan. Taken together, the competition surrounding Bangladesh is steadily intensifying.

According to analysts, Bangladesh risks essentially becoming the new geopolitical battleground of South Asia under these circumstances. This is because every major power wants to keep Bangladesh within its own strategic sphere of influence. Consequently, the impact of any decision will be felt not just in the economy, but also across security, foreign policy, and regional stability.

As a result, this presents the ultimate diplomatic test for Dhaka. On one hand, opportunities for economic development, new markets, infrastructure, and investments cannot be missed. On the other hand, relations with neighboring India are equally important for Bangladesh. The two countries share a land border of nearly 4,000 kilometers, extensive trade, electricity cooperation, river management, and security cooperation.

The Bangladesh government has already stated that no final decision has been made regarding the corridor. A decision will be reached only after considering national interest, economic gain, security, regional stability, and diplomatic balance. China has also mentioned that other nations, including India, could join this corridor in the future if they wish.

Altogether, the China-Myanmar-Bangladesh Economic Corridor is becoming a defining strategic issue in South Asia. Bangladesh faces both immense economic potential and the difficult challenge of maintaining a diplomatic balance. Failing to manage this delicate equation of development and geopolitics could generate new risks alongside the benefits. It is for this reason that the future of the corridor is no longer just a question of an infrastructure project. It has become deeply intertwined with the future strategic balance of Bangladesh, India, and the entire Bay of Bengal region.

Previously, around 2013, discussions began regarding the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar (BCIM) corridor. Following the Rohingya crisis in 2017, Myanmar-related diplomacy became even more critical for Bangladesh.

Between 2020 and 2021, a new discourse emerged within the India-Bangladesh-China triangle over China's investment proposal for the Teesta River development project.

Subsequently, in June of this year, the context of the China-Myanmar-Bangladesh corridor resurfaced during a meeting between Bangladesh Prime Minister Tarique Rahman and Xi Jinping during the Prime Minister's visit to Beijing. The Chinese Ambassador to Dhaka, Yao Wen, publicly commented on the corridor. The Bangladesh government stated that the proposal is still under review and no final decision has been made.