BRICS summit and Bangladesh in the global equation
Graphics: Agamir Somoy
Amid the current turbulent international situation and new global polarization, growing interest has emerged in world politics over the future course of BRICS. Although the bloc has expanded its geographic reach beyond its original five countries by accepting new members, questions remain about its internal unity and effectiveness. At this critical juncture marked by the prolonged war in Ukraine, the Iran conflict and the emergence of new security alliances such as the Mecca Agreement involving Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan, there is ample scope for a deeper review of BRICS’ internal politics and its role as a representative of the Global South.
From an external perspective, the political and diplomatic importance of the BRICS summit scheduled to take place this month is significant. When powerful economic and political powers such as China, Russia, India and Brazil sit at the same table to exchange views, it naturally draws the attention of the international media and creates significant reactions in global politics. The gathering of heads of state at the BRICS summit is a major institutional message that the international economic and political structure centered around the United States is gradually facing various challenges. In particular, the prolonged war in Ukraine and the subsequent Iran centered conflict have created new concerns worldwide over Western economic sanctions and restrictions on the use of the SWIFT banking system. Many countries now feel the need for alternative systems to reduce unilateral pressure on their economies. The impact of these summits is undeniable from this perspective as well.
However, deep differences still remain over the fundamental and strategic implementation of BRICS. One of the major goals of establishing BRICS was said to be the creation of an economic system that could serve as an alternative to the US dollar or the pursuit of de-dollarization. In reality, however, this is an extremely complex issue. Since the introduction of the petrodollar system in 1971, the US dollar has established itself as the principal currency of global trade. Although China is interested in strengthening its own currency, the yuan, in international trade, India has direct psychological and strategic objections to this approach. Although Brazil and other countries have taken some positive positions, no overall currency-based consensus has emerged within BRICS. Similarly, member states have shown different reactions to the wars in Ukraine and Iran in terms of international security conflicts and diplomatic positions. As a result, BRICS has yet to take a unified or strong position on political and strategic changes.
The intense discussion and interest that once existed in Bangladesh over joining BRICS seems to have subsided somewhat. An analysis of the issue reveals two practical reasons. The first is the policy and strategic position. For current policymakers, the Western world is receiving importance in the country’s overall foreign policy, particularly the interest in maintaining close diplomatic and economic balance with the United States.
Many believe BRICS may gain significant momentum or political momentum amid major crises in the global economic system or the tense situations in the Middle East and Eastern Europe. In reality, however, it faces several strong obstacles. First, questions remain about how universally acceptable the political and governance models of Russia or China can be made in the Global South or in world politics. Second, there is the longstanding geopolitical rivalry between China and India, two of the most powerful pillars of BRICS. The impact of the distance between the two countries is also clear in other areas of international relations. As a result, although global crises may create the possibility of BRICS gaining visible momentum in international economics and security, these internal contradictions are slowing that possibility.
The intense discussion and interest that once existed in Bangladesh over joining BRICS seems to have subsided somewhat. An analysis of the issue reveals two practical reasons. The first is the policy and strategic position. For current policymakers, the Western world is receiving importance in the country’s overall foreign policy, particularly the interest in maintaining close diplomatic and economic balance with the United States. Against this backdrop, joining a bloc that is perceived as anti-Western creates strategic complications for the current government. As a result, the government appears to consider a somewhat cautious approach and avoiding pressure from global politics to be more reasonable.
The second reason is related entirely to pragmatic diplomacy. Bangladesh has deep bilateral diplomatic and economic relations with important BRICS countries such as India, China, Russia and Brazil as well as the newly added Middle Eastern countries. Therefore, where there are opportunities to secure commercial interests through direct bilateral communication with these states, the extent to which becoming a BRICS member and becoming involved in policy tensions would provide strategic benefits remains a matter of debate.
On the other hand, Bangladesh’s recent observatory approach toward the Mecca Agreement represents a major test of the country’s overall foreign policy. The basic policy declared by the current government is “Bangladesh First” and avoiding alignment with any specific bloc. On one hand, some parties view BRICS as an anti-Western or anti West political platform. Joining it therefore presents a policy challenge for the government. On the other hand, the Mecca Agreement is taking the shape of a clear military structure. BRICS, at least officially, remains an economic and diplomatic platform where it is easier to present economic arguments. But becoming directly involved in a clear military structure or ideological bloc could undermine Bangladesh’s core neutral foreign policy. In this reality, I believe caution is necessary regarding any form of polarization.
However, Bangladesh has placed greater emphasis on utilizing the economic benefits associated with BRICS rather than obtaining political membership in the core BRICS bloc. For example, without being a BRICS member, Bangladesh is connected with the New Development Bank (NDB) and is receiving development assistance and loan facilities for infrastructure and various development projects. This is serving as an extremely low risk and specific beneficial model for Bangladesh’s economy.
Bangladesh has its own strategic approach to whether the internal tensions between China and India are creating any form of bilateral instability for Bangladesh. China is one of Bangladesh’s major trading partners, a supplier of raw materials and a major investor in the infrastructure sector. At the same time, Bangladesh has deep geographical, historical and security ties with India. Bangladesh is working with both countries according to their respective capabilities while keeping its economic and geographical needs separate. Although New Delhi and Beijing manage their own regional politics, Bangladesh’s needs based balance is now viewed by them as a practical reality of being neighbors.
The alternative system being discussed for the global monetary system or world politics cannot emerge overnight. Therefore, until an alternative is created, countries in blocs such as BRICS will only be able to agree on issues where there is no direct conflict of interests. Given this reality, the smartest course of action for Bangladesh is to avoid entering any military or tense bloc, use economic channels such as the New Development Bank and strengthen its own bilateral strategic diplomacy while prioritizing its national interests.
Author: Former ambassador and diplomatic analyst
