The revolution’s mosquito theory did not work

In 1945 and 1946, when an almost revolutionary situation had emerged across India and rebellions had erupted in different places, the Communist Party failed to lead them. Instead, the Communist Party called for unity between the Congress and the Muslim League. As a result, the bourgeoisie became stronger and was able to move forward openly, pushing the socialists behind. The bourgeoisie favored constitutional movements, and participation in elections occupied a major place in its political program. The Communist Party also participated in elections, although it could not make much headway. It won three seats in 1947, four in 1954 and five after participating in an election under Ershad. The wrong path of armed struggle adopted in 1948, followed by a softer approach in the face of repression, the Sino Soviet split, and the pro bourgeois attitude of the pro Soviet groups all helped the nationalists become stronger. The nationalists regarded the communists as class enemies and treated them accordingly, sometimes ignoring them and sometimes persecuting them. The adoption of an extremist approach by the pro China groups was not revolutionary in its social character either. It was essentially petty bourgeois. Maulana Bhashani was a close ally of the communists, but the communists could not remain with him. The pro Soviet groups considered him radical, while the pro China groups viewed him as petty bourgeois. As a result, the possibility of building strength by keeping Maulana Bhashani alongside them and at the forefront was not utilized. The communists remained on the margins, while the nationalists were the ones who displayed the “heroism.”

The final point of Sheikh Mujib’s Six Point demands called for the “power to form and maintain a paramilitary force” to preserve regional solidarity and the constitutional system. After the establishment of Bangladesh, not a paramilitary force but a full fledged military was formed. A section of that very force brutally killed Bangabandhu and his family and seized state power. After that, internal disagreements and personal rivalries led them to engage in mutual killings. Hussain Muhammad Ershad, who had returned from Pakistan, seized the presidency through an episode of bloodshed and introduced Islam as the state religion, which was a gross betrayal of the spirit of the Liberation War.

But the military and civilian bourgeois rulers were united on one issue: eliminating the left. On many other issues, they not only had differences among themselves but also showed deep hostility toward one another. But their unity on this particular issue was unbreakable. The Mujib Bahini was formed during the war, with its main objective being to suppress the leftists. The state formed Rakkhi Bahini also came to have the suppression of leftists as one of its primary duties. The social persecution of communists by portraying them as foreign agents and atheists began from the very moment the party started its journey and continued afterward. Alongside state repression, the Communist Party had to move forward while confronting social hostility.

The pro Soviet groups said he was radical, while the pro China groups considered him petty bourgeois. As a result, the possibility of building strength by keeping Maulana Bhashani alongside them and at the forefront was not utilized. The communists remained on the margins, while the nationalists were the ones who displayed the “heroism.”

There was also the grip of idealism and spirituality. In India, the materialist tradition that existed in philosophical thought, with Charvaka known as its principal representative, was wiped out by the Brahmins through the use of power. Buddhists did not believe in God. They were humanists and also described themselves as egalitarian. But they were not particularly interested in the material world. Moreover, they believed in the principle of “nonviolence” and in individual transformation. As a result, when B R Ambedkar, the leader of the Dalits in British India, formally abandoned his Hindu religious identity in protest against the Brahmanical intolerance of Hindu nationalists, he did not turn toward Marxism. He turned toward Buddhism, meaning he remained within religion.

In modern India, the two extraordinary personalities who were most influential in nurturing idealism were Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi and Rabindranath Tagore. Although the two differed greatly on many other issues, their relationship in this regard was one of friendship. Gandhi was extremely influential politically. Although he condemned the caste system, he did not seek its abolition. He was certainly noncommunal, but it cannot be said that he was secular in his political outlook. Subhas Chandra Bose rebelled against Gandhi’s “compromising” leadership and took the path of armed uprising. But he too was essentially a nationalist. Although he spoke of socialism, his socialism was by no means Marxist Leninist. It was nationalist. For “national liberation,” he did not hesitate to seek the help of Nazi Germany and imperialist Japan. At one point, he also expressed admiration for Mussolini. Rabindranath Tagore was fond of Subhas Chandra Bose and praised his heroic leadership. It is also significant that, even if temporarily, he himself viewed Mussolini’s early activities positively. Subhas Chandra Bose was a true Bengali, but politically he believed in Indian nationalism. Rabindranath was the greatest among Bengalis, but he too did not hesitate to identify himself as an Indian. Jawaharlal Nehru was close to Subhas Chandra Bose and also moved away from him, mainly because of his reliance on Gandhi. He himself said that he could have become a communist if he had not ultimately been a nationalist. During a visit to the Soviet Union, Rabindranath was very pleased to see the revolutionary progress of its social system, but he did not consider social ownership to be supportable at all.

There were exceptionally talented people in Bengal’s communist movement. They organized movements, wrote, endured imprisonment and persecution, and still did not give up. But the continuity of their work was not maintained, nor did it expand significantly. One reason was the party’s organizational weakness. The second reason, and a very major one, was the Partition of 1947. As a result, the party was also forced to split into two. Many leaders and activists left East Bengal, and the party’s membership fell from 12,000 to 2,000. The party was devastated by state repression and social hostility. This was followed internationally by revisionism and, locally, by compromise and opportunism.

One of the main strengths of the Marxist Leninist struggle is a high level of intellectual and cultural quality. Bangladesh did not achieve this easily. Let us take one example. At a historic gathering of the nationalists, a working class follower of the pro Soviet Communist Party was sitting beside one of the party’s theoreticians. Hearing the nationalist speakers repeatedly talk about liberation, the working man asked his leader, “How will these bourgeois bring liberation? If they come to power, they too will carry out the same exploitation.”

In response, the theoretician reassured him by saying, “They are local mosquitoes. Even if they suck blood, we can keep them under control. We can take out the blood they have sucked. But the blood sucking foreign mosquitoes will fly away, and they cannot be caught.”

It is not known how reassured the working man was after hearing this. But the fact that all mosquitoes know how to fly cannot be disputed. It did not turn out otherwise. And just as before, the working people continued to suffer afterward. The revolution’s mosquito theory did not work.

Writer: Emeritus Professor, University of Dhaka