AL never imagined its fall

On August 5, 2024, the Awami League government—which had held continuous power for over fifteen and a half years—collapsed in the face of a fierce mass uprising led by students and the general public. Yet right up until midday that day, the now-banned party had not sensed the slightest hint that it was about to lose power.

From top leadership down to grassroots activists, the party maintained firm faith that party chief Sheikh Hasina would forcefully contain the Anti-Discrimination Student Movement, just as she had handled past political crises. Confident that she would navigate the temporary pressure and reassert their strength, party members remained active on the ground across the country, including in Dhaka, until that fateful afternoon.

Party sources indicate that up until the final moments, the Awami League's decision-makers failed to accurately assess reality. Sheikh Hasina’s obstinacy, combined with the aggressive stance of law enforcement, the administration, and party loyalists nationwide, fueled excessive confidence among party strategists.

This complacency stemmed from surviving numerous trials throughout their fifteen-and-a-half-year rule. The leaders held clear memories of suppressing the Hefazat-e-Islam rally at Shapla Shapla Square on May 5, 2013, holding a one-sided election on January 5, 2014, putting down protests following the controversial night-time voting of 2018, and thwarting the BNP's continuous blockades and strikes ahead of the January 7, 2024 elections. Replaying these precedents during the turbulent days of July, they harbored the illusion that history would simply repeat itself.

The decision-makers assumed that deploying heavy-handed police actions and sending party cadres into the streets would crush this student-led movement as it had done to previous ones. Furthermore, by framing the unrest as opposition-instigated, they repeatedly dismissed the core grievances. Even when the movement transformed into a spontaneous mass uprising in the final week of July, internal party discussions centered entirely on ways to suppress the demonstrators. Intelligence agencies allegedly misled the head of government, delivering sugarcoated reports claiming the situation was nearly under control instead of presenting the grim reality on the ground.

Many senior leaders clung to the hope that their total grip on the administration would resolve the situation before it reached a critical breaking point.

The political gamble on August 4—the day before the fall—proved catastrophic when the party pit its affiliated organizations directly against the rising crowd. The day saw widespread violence and loss of life across the country. Still, Awami League leaders believed they retained control of the streets and that Sheikh Hasina would manage the crisis.

All calculations shattered on the morning of August 5 when hundreds of thousands of citizens flooded the streets of Dhaka for the 'March to Dhaka' program. The situation swiftly slipped beyond the control of security forces, and intelligence reports revealed a dire picture. Within hours, it became glaringly obvious that maintaining the security perimeter around Gono Bhaban and Bangabhaban was impossible. Sheikh Hasina was left with no option but to flee the country.

Even then, Awami League cadres remained in denial, holding their ground in various neighborhoods. Up until noon, the central party office, the party president's political office in Dhanmondi, and the Prime Minister's official residence at Gono Bhaban were bustling with activity, while armed activists maintained positions across local neighborhoods.

When news of Sheikh Hasina's resignation and departure to India broke shortly before noon, party members nationwide plunged into deep shock and confusion. Many could not comprehend that a total power shift had unfolded in a matter of hours. The post-fall chaos and complete lack of leadership revealed that no tier of the Awami League was prepared for such a scenario. The entire party network collapsed instantaneously—a direct consequence of treating a deep political crisis strictly as a security issue.